Abstract. A data link protocol developed and used by Philips Electronics is modeled and veri ed using I/O automata theory. Correctness is computer-checked with the Coq proof development system.
Introduction
The data-link layer of a telecommunication protocol is veri ed and proof-checked. The protocol has been designed to communicate messages of arbitrary length over unreliable channels. The messages are transmitted in small packets or frames. The protocol does not rely on fairness of data transmission channels, i.e., repeated transmission of a frame does not guarantee its eventual arrival. For this reason, the number of retransmission attempts is limited and the protocol is called Bounded Retransmission Protocol.
Reliable communication protocols are vital to the telecommunication industry. They are also of increasing importance to the electronics business because more and more products consist of communicating subsystems and because many products integrate technology from the elds of computers, telecommunication devices, and consumer electronics. The pressure for reliability of the protocols involved poses an important challenge to veri cation techniques.
Design, implementation and testing of communication protocols is a complicated and error-prone activity. For many protocol-based products, erroneous protocol behavior is met by error-recovery procedures or by issuing a new software release. For some products however, error situations are not acceptable and software maintenance is impossible. Correctness of protocols is usually examined by careful testing of implementations.
Thorough testing increases con dence but testing is only semi-decidable: it may reveal the presence of errors but not the absence of errors. Protocol veri cation is required to obtain a higher degree of con dence. The protocol is modeled in a mathematical structure and correctness is guaranteed by showing that the protocol satis es the required behavior under all circumstances. Veri cation is not restricted to implementations but can also be applied to designs that have not yet been implemented. It should be stressed however that although veri cation excludes design errors, it cannot replace testing of implementations.
A hand-written protocol veri cation may itself contain certain errors that can be eliminated by computer tools. Veri cation errors can be classi ed into two categories: wrong assumptions and wrong deductions, corresponding to errors in the protocol model and to errors in its correctness proof, respectively. Errors of the rst type are the responsibility of the modeler. Errors of the second type can be eliminated using computer tools for proof development or proof-checking. There is an additional advantage to the use of computer tools in protocol veri cation. Protocol veri cation is a labour-intensive and a non-trivial activity: much e ort of skilled experts is required. With the current state-of-the-art, it is cost-e ective only for those (parts of) protocols that are truly critical. Computer tools will enable more e cient veri cation of protocols.
In this paper we describe a veri cation and the associated proof-checking of a simpli ed and stylized version of a Philips telecommunication protocol. First, the protocol is proven correct using the input/output automaton model of Lynch and Tuttle 19] , a formalism based on extended nite state machines. Next, the veri cation is proof-checked in type theory with the Coq system 9]. The objective of this work is twofold. The rst objective is to prove correctness of the protocol with the highest possible level of con dence. The second objective of this work is to bring to light all technical issues that are involved in obtaining this result.
A starting point for the work described here was an algebraic speci cation of the protocol in PSF 22] , a language based on process algebra. This speci cation was developed and validated using PSF simulation tools. The PSF description was translated into I/O automata theory and a suitable correctness criterion was de ned. The protocol was veri ed by proving that it satis es the correctness criterion. This speci cation and veri cation were then translated into type theory and checked with the Coq proof development system. This paper is divided into the following parts: Section 2 gives an informal description of the protocol. Next, Section 3 explains the veri cation of the protocol. Section 4 discusses the proof-checking with the Coq system. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the results.
Protocol Outline
Like most data link protocols, the Bounded Retransmission Protocol can be regarded as an extended version of the Alternating Bit Protocol. The protocol uses a stop-and-wait approach known as`positive acknowledgement with retransmission ' 27] : after transmission of a frame the sender waits for an acknowledgement before sending a new frame. The protocol procedures are similar to the LAPB link control procedures of the X.25 protocol 6] (for X.25 acknowledged mode and window size = 1, viz. one outstanding unacknowledged frame). Incoming frames are checked for errors. Correctly received frames are acknowledged while erroneous frames are simply discarded. If the acknowledgement fails to appear, the sender times out and retransmits the frame. An alternating bit is used to detect duplication of a frame. Real-time aspects are limited to the use of time-outs to detect loss of frames and loss of acknowledgements. Three service primitives are o ered by the protocol: a request and con rm service at the sender side, and an indication service at the receiver side.
{ REQ(s)
The request service to transmit a nite list s of data. Each datum will be transferred in a separate message frame.
{ CONF(c) (c 2 fC OK; C NOT OK; C DONT KNOWg)
The con rmation service that informs the sender about the result of a request. 
{ IND NOT OK
The indication service to report loss of contact to the sender. Only part of a message has been received.
The protocol control procedures will be described by means of a sender S, a receiver R, and two communication channels K and L ( Figure 1 ). We will assume that K and L are lossy channels: message frames are either lost or they arrive without corruption in the order in which they are sent. Messages can be communicated over ports REQ, CONF, F, G, A, B, IND. A data frame consists of a datum preceded by a header with three information bits named rst, last and toggle: ( rst; last; toggle; datum). Bits rst and last indicate if a packet is the rst or last frame of a series, respectively. For a single-frame message both are set. toggle plays the role of alternating bit to distinguish between subsequent data frames. Acknowledgement frames consist of these three information bits only: ( rst; last; toggle). This procedure is repeated until the last frame is sent with rst=false, last=true, and datum=d n . The receiver sends IND(d n ; I OK) to report completion of the message and acknowledges receipt. The sender then informs the application of the successful dispatch of the transmission request with CONF(C OK). Now consider a transmission where data or acknowledgement frames are lost.
First we take the sender's point of view. Upon sending a frame the sender S starts a timer t 1 and waits until either the frame is acknowledged or the timer goes o .
If the acknowledgement is received, the timer is switched o and the next frame is sent. The timer is attuned to exceed the round trip time for sending a data frame and receipt of its acknowledgement. If the timer goes o no acknowledgement can come anymore and the frame is retransmitted.
The number of retransmission attempts is bounded by a parameter max, and if this maximum number of retransmissions has been reached, the sender gives up. The con rmation service is invoked in one of two ways: if the data frame in question is not the last frame of a series, then CONF(C NOT OK) con rms failure of message transfer. For the last data frame, a CONF(C DONT KNOW) is called: there is no way the sender can tell if the last frame was lost and never arrived, or if its acknowledgement was lost.
Finally consider the loss of frames from the receiver's point of view. Suppose a lost data frame is not the rst one, i.e. the receiver is expecting a data frame follow-up. Upon receipt of a data frame, the receiver starts a timer t 2 and goes to a waiting state. When a data frame arrives it is acknowledged and timer t 2 is switched o . If the data frame has a ipped toggle then it is new and it is also indicated to the upper layers. When no data frame arrives, timer t 2 goes o eventually and service IND NOT OK is called. Timer t 2 will only go o if the sender has aborted the transmission, and therefore t 2 > max t 1 . 3 Veri cation
I/O Automata Theory
In this section we give a brief account of those parts of I/O automata theory that we need for the purposes of the paper. For a more extensive introduction to the I/O automata model we refer to 19, 20] .
I/O automata An action signature S is a triple (in(S); out(S); int(S)) of three disjoint sets of respectively input actions, output actions and internal actions.
The derived sets of external actions, locally controlled actions and actions of S are de ned respectively by ext(S) = in(S) out(S); local(S) = out(S) int(S); acts(S) = in(S) out(S) int(S):
We say that S is nite if acts(S) is a nite set.
An I/O automaton A consists of the following ve components:
{ an action signature sig(A) (we will write in(A) for in(sig(A)), out(A) for out(sig (A) 
The composition A = k n i=1 A i of a nite collection of compatible I/O automata A 1 ; : : : ; A n is the I/O automaton de ned as follows: Because in I/O automata input actions are always enabled, they will typically not have deadlocks in the sense of states without any outgoing transitions.
Instead we de ne deadlock freeness as a relation between I/O automata. If A is deadlock free with respect to B, this means that whenever it is possible to reach a quiescent state of A via some trace, we can also reach a quiescent state of B with the same trace. Thus A can only become inactive when this is allowed by B.
In I/O automata theory, inclusion of fair traces is commonly used as implementation relation. Intuitively, one may think of B as de ning a set of constraints, which A must obey. Note that A does not need exhibit all of the behaviors in fairtraces(B); merely a subset is su cient. However, by requiring that A and B have the same input actions, and since input actions must always be enabled, trivial implementations are excluded. Here it is important to note that the concept of fairness used within the I/O automata model is feasible in the sense of 1]: each nite execution of an I/O automaton can be extended to a fair execution (for instance, by giving turns in a roundrobin way to all classes that are continuously enabled). As a consequence it also follows that A implements B implies that A is safe with respect to B. In general, A implements B does not imply that A is deadlock free with respect to B. This is because a quiescent execution of A may be matched by a divergent fair execution of B, i.e., an in nite execution in which after some point only internal actions occur. However, it is easy to see that the implication does hold if B is divergence free in the sense that it has no divergent fair executions.
Re nements In the literature, a whole menagerie of so-called simulation techniques has been proposed to prove that the set of ( nite, quiescent, fair,: : :) traces of one automaton is included in that of another. We refer to 21] the protocol that we analyze in this paper we will establish a weak re nement that maps quiescent executions to quiescent executions, and fair executions to fair executions, and these additional properties immediately imply absence of deadlock and the implementation relation.
The precondition/e ect style In the I/O automata approach, the automata that model the basic building blocks of a system are usually speci ed in the socalled precondition/e ect style. In this section we will brie y describe the syntax of this language.
We start from a typed signature together with a -algebra A which gives meaning to the function and constant symbols in . To describe properties, we use a rst-order language over signature and a set V of (typed) variables, with equality and inequality predicates, and the usual logical connectives. If :enabled(a)
It follows that a state s of the automaton associated to G is quiescent i it satis es formula quiescent(G). The reader will observe that the translation from I/O automata generators to I/O automata is quite straightforward. In fact, Lynch and Tuttle 19, 20] do not even bother to distinguish between these two levels of description. For the formalization of I/O automata theory in Coq the distinction between the semantic and syntactic levels is of course important, which is why we have discussed it here. The de nition of I/O automata generators has been inspired by similar de nitions in the work of Jonsson (see, for instance, 15]). In the sequel we will, like Lynch and Tuttle, often refer to I/O automata when we actually mean I/O automata generators.
Protocol Speci cation
In this section, we present the formal speci cation of the Bounded Retransmission Protocol. Following a brief description of the many-sorted algebra that we use, we will rst give I/O automata for each of the components of the protocol, and then de ne the full protocol as the composition of these I/O automata. At the end of this section we will moreover present the de nition of an I/O automaton that gives the intended external behavior of the protocol. Since the BRP protocol has been explained already in considerable detail in Section 2, we will not repeat that explanation here, and con ne ourselves in this section to the formal de nitions, together with a brief discussion of some of the notation and certain modeling assumptions.
Data types We start the speci cation of the protocol with a description of the various data types that play a role. We assume a typed signature and a -algebra A which consist of the following components: { a type Bool of booleans with constant symbols true and false, and a standard repertoire of function symbols (^, _, :, !), all with the standard interpretation over the booleans. Also, we require, for all types S in , an equality, { a type Nat of natural numbers, with constant symbol 0, successor function symbol succ, and function symbol : Nat Nat ! Bool, all with the usual interpretation. We also need a constant symbol max, which denotes the maximum number of retransmissions within the protocol.
{ a type Data of data elements that the protocol has to transmit. We nd it convenient to assume the presence of a constant symbol ? of type Data, which denotes the unde ned data element. The intended meaning of all these constants will be explained further on in this section. We assume that the interpretation of Conf, Ind, Spc and Rpc is free, in the sense that, for each of these types, di erent constants symbols are mapped to di erent elements in their domain (\no confusion"), and each element in the domain is denoted by some constant symbol (\no junk").
{ We write pc 2 fSF; WA; SCg for pc=SF _ pc=WA _ pc=SC, etc. { To improve readability we sometimes use Lamport's list notation for conjunction.
The sender We will now present the I/O automaton S, which models the sender of the protocol. We have modeled the arrival of a request (REQ) as an input action, since it is clearly under control of the environment. However, once we have taken this decision the I/O automata model forces us to specify, for all possible states, what happens if an REQ action occurs. In our modeling, the sender discards an incoming request if it is busy handling the previous request, something which is recorded by the boolean state variable busy.
T3 is a time out action that occurs when S wants to send a frame into channel K but does not succeed because other agents (not speci ed here) are using the channel. After the occurrence of a T3 action, S will send a con rmation message C DONT KNOW or C NOT OK.
When S sends a frame into channel K by doing F, it simultaneously starts a timer by setting boolean state variable timer1 on to true. This timer will timeout if an acknowledgement for the frame does not arrive in time. Since we cannot explicitly model real-time aspects in the I/O automata model, we deal with this timing behavior in a di erent way. Under the assumptions that (1) the transmission of a frame through channels K and L takes a bounded time, and (2) R will always acknowledge an incoming frame in a bounded time, and (3) the timer is set properly, a timeout will occur i a frame gets lost in channel K or in channel L. Thus one could say that the loss of a message in the channel \causes" a timeout action. In our speci cation we have made these causal links visible by introducing output actions E1K and E1L for channels K and L, respectively, which occur when a message gets lost, and corresponding input actions E1K and E1L of sender S, whose occurrence sets a boolean state variable timer1 enabled.
By taking timer1 enabled to be part of the precondition of the timeout action T1 , this gives us the desired causal links.
If something goes wrong during the handling of a request, and S sends a C DONT KNOW or C NOT OK con rmation message, then before dealing with a new request, S will wait long enough to make sure that the receiver R is prepared to receive new frames. Also here, since we cannot deal with real-time directly within our model, we describe the causal links that result from these realtime constraints. After sending a C DONT KNOW or C NOT OK con rmation message, the sender does an output action E2 , which corresponds to starting a new timer (that is not speci ed here). Since it depends on the state of R when this timer will timeout, E2 is made into an input action of R. At the appropriate moment R will generate the timeout action T2 for the timer started by S, so that S can proceed and handle the next request.
We now give the code for I/O automaton S. The subtle part in the de nition of R is again the part concerned with timing.
The receiver has a timer of its own, which is started at the moment an acknowledgement message is sent by setting a boolean variable timer2 on to true. The timer will time out if after some time still no new frame has arrived at port G and it is clear that the sender has interrupted the transmission a list. When a timeout occurs, the receiver sets ctoggle to false to indicate that it will not reject the next frame on basis of its toggle bit, and it generates an indication NOT OK in case some messages have not yet been received. If R has set the timer and S generates an E2 action, then a transmission has been interrupted and a timeout action may occur. For convenience we identify in our model E2 with the timeout action. However, if an E2 action occurs and the receiver's timer has not been set, then this action should not be interpreted as a timeout, but just as a signal that an action T2 can be generated at the sender side.
We now present the code for I/O automaton R. Requests that arrive at a time when the previous request has not yet been processed are ignored. While a request is being processed, something may go wrong at any point and, instead of the C OK message a C DONT KNOW or a C NOT OK con rmation message may be sent. The C DONT KNOW message will only occur, however, if at most one data element has not been delivered, and the C NOT OK will only occur if at least one data element has not been delivered. If a C NOT OK or C DONT KNOW message is sent somewhere in the middle of the processing of a request, i.e., after the rst but before the last data element has been delivered, P generates a NOT OK message. After such a message P returns to its initial state, except if it has just received a new request, which will then be processed.
Below we present the code of I/O automaton P. In the next section we will establish that BRP is an implementation of P. on the behavior of the protocol. The third clause implies that sender S will never send a frame into channel K when the channel is busy delivering another frame. Similarly, receiver R will never send a frame into channel L when L already contains a frame. Thus the protocol does not need communication channels with a bu ering capacity of more than one. Clause three and six together give that there will never be a message in both K and L at the same time. Thus, an implementation of the protocol may use a single bidirectional medium to implement both channels. If channel L delivers a frame to the sender S, then S is in fact waiting for this frame to arrive. Similarly, if channel K delivers a frame to receiver R, then the receiver is waiting for this frame. It follows rather directly from invariant INV1 that in each reachable state of the protocol at most one of the four components enables a locally controlled action. This means that the protocol operates in a is fully sequential way.
Invariants INVR of Lemma 3 gives some relationships between the state variables of R. For the induction step, suppose that s 0 is reachable via an execution with length n + 1. Then there exists a state s that is reachable via an execution of length n and s a ?! s 0 , for some action a. By induction hypothesis, s j = INVR. We prove s 0 j = INVR by a routine case distinction on a. In the proof we will use several times that, by Lemma 2, s j = INV1. The next invariant INVL implies that when an acknowledgement message arrives at the sender, the three bits of this acknowledgement are determined by the state of the sender, and hence provide no information. The only information conveyed by an acknowledgement is the fact of its arrival itself, the rest is redundant. The following invariant is not used in the proof of the re nement, but is interesting because it implies that, when a frame arrives at the receiver, the rst eld of this frame is determined by the state of the receiver and the other elds of the frame. Hence the rst bit of the frame conveys no information and is redundant.
Lemma 5. The following property INVK 0 is an invariant of BRP.
K:full ! K: rst=if (R:ctoggle ! K:toggle =R:toggle) then R: rst else R: rst Safety We have now prepared the ground for the rst main results of this paper: the existence of a weak re nement from BRP to P. Since states of BRP and P are fully determined by the values of their state variables, we can de ne a weak re nement from BRP to P by expressing the values of the state variables of P in terms of those of BRP. The weak re nement function, which is given in Theorem 6, turns out to be surprisingly simple: P:list is either S:list or tl(S:list), P:busy is just S:busy, P: rst is just R: rst, and P:error holds i the receiver's program counter equals NOK or will necessarily do so after the next locally controlled action. Corollary 9. BRP is deadlock free with respect to P.
Implementation We now come to the main result of this section, which says that the Bounded Retransmission Protocol correctly implementation speci cation P. Given that we have already shown that BRP is safe and deadlock free, the essential fact that remains to be established is that BRP is divergence free, i.e., will always eventually produce some allowed output after a given input. As is usual with liveness properties, we show this by presenting a weight function that maps states onto a well-founded domain (the natural numbers in our case) and demonstrating that after an input all actions, except possible further inputs and the required outputs, decrease the weight. Theorem 11. BRP implements P. Proof. Assume that 2 fairtraces(BRP). We must prove 2 fairtraces(P). Let = s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 s 2 be a fair execution of BRP with trace . If is nite then is quiescent and it follows by Corollary 9 that P has a quiescent execution with trace . Since each quiescent execution is also fair, this implies 2 fairtraces(P). So we may assume w.l.o.g. that is in nite.
Using the fact that REF is a weak re nement (Theorem 6) we can easily construct an execution 0 of P with trace . It remains to prove that 0 is fair.
For this we distinguish between two cases.
1. contains in nitely many CONF actions. Since part(P) contains only one class, and execution 0 contains in nitely many occurrences of actions from that class, 0 is fair.
2. contains only nitely many CONF actions. Call an input action a i in discarded if s i?1 = s i . Then between any pair of non-discarded inputs in there must be a CONF action, because a non-discarded input always changes S:busy from false to true, and CONF is the only action that can set S:busy to false again. Thus there is a point N in after which there are no more CONF actions and moreover all inputs are discarded. This implies that 0 is fair. 4 
Proof-Checking
In this Section, we report on the proof-checking of the protocol veri cation of Section 3. We have checked the proofs of all the invariants (Lemmas 2, 3, 4 and 5, as well as some other invariants that we needed as lemmas but that are not discussed here), the proof that REF is a weak re nement (Theorem 6), and the proof that REF preserves quiescence (Theorem 8). We did not proofcheck \meta-results" such as Lemma 1 and Corollaries 7 and 9. Also, we have not checked the \liveness" result of Theorem 11. Proof-checking these results as well would have required a considerable e ort with, at least in the case of the Bounded Retransmission Protocol, only a small payo . Still we think that the formalization and mechanical checking of these type of results will be an important topic of future research.
Coq Proof Development System
Coq is a proof assistant for higher-order logic. It is based on the Calculus of Inductive Constructions 24], which is a polymorphic type theory allowing dependent types and inductive types. Constructing a proof in Coq is an interactive process. The user speci es the proof strategy (e.g. which deduction rule should be applied) and Coq does all the calculations.
Notation Coq is based on type theory, which means that (apart from some built in`pretty printing' rules) all applications are denoted in pre-x. In this paper we adapt the ASCII input and output of Coq in order to improve the readability. We write Inductive types In our encodings we extensively use inductive types. 
Protocol Speci cation
The hand-written proof is written in many sorted predicate logic. For each sort there is an equality relation. We use the built-in encoding of polymorphic Leibniz equality eq := A:Set : a:A : Ind(X :A ! Prop)fX ag to represent these equalities. Furthermore we use the standard encodings for conjunction and disjunction, brie y explained in the previous subsection. The types Prop and Set, also mentioned in the previous subsection, are prede ned notions (constants) of Coq, comparable with the star ( ) in systems of the Barendregt sum := x; y:nat : < z :nat : nat>Match x with y z :nat : S (1) The advantage of the second approach is that one does not have to give any command for computing the value of (sum n m). Computation in this case is just normalization, and done automatically by the system. Note that Coq can not reduce (sum n O) to n when n is a variable. In such a case one can do a case analysis on n. We try to use the second approach as much as possible. In Coq it is allowed to omit the -abstraction in <P>Match x with : : : when P x does not actually depend on x. So < nat > Match x with : : : can replace < z : nat : nat > Match x with : : : in (1). In the sequel we will omit suchabstractions.
The main result in the hand-written proof is that there exists a weak renement from automaton BRP to automaton P. We modi ed our encodings several times in order to get a better formulation in Coq of this weak re nement property. In the approach that we have chosen eventually, we can represent the LIST := Ind(X :Set)fX j data ! X ! Xg { The nite sets Spc, Rpc, Conf and Ind are encoded as inductive types in the same style as the booleans. Some versions of Coq can not distinguish inductive types that have the same structure. Choosing di erent names for such types just introduces di erent names for the same expression. In particular, nite sets that have the same cardinality are not distinguished. For instance Spc and Rpc are two abbreviations for the same type Ind(X : Set)fX j X j X j X j Xg. We can prove SF = WF by re exivity because SF and WF are both the rst element of a set of ve elements. A typing error Rpc ( R (x)) = WA in one of the invariants was overlooked for a long time.
Similar to the binary operators and 6 on bool, we have de ned -terms representing and 6 on Spc, Rpc, Conf and Ind. Note: SF = WF : Prop and SF WF : bool.
The actions We de ne nite sets act BRP and act P representing the sets of actions. We can not use the same name for actions of di erent automata. Hence we add a prime ( R ) ) This is the result of matching s 1 and s 2 with the terms of type states BRP on which X is applied in the rst{constructor{case of step (describing the behavior of the request action).
In our approach we encode directly how the actions a ect the product automaton BRP. This way we avoid the problem of encoding how the composition of the automaton BRP out of its components S, K, L and R is organized. The fact that local actions that have the same name are synchronized in the product automaton is di cult to express.
Some actions are split in more than one case. For instance the action B is split into B 1 with extra precondition one(list)=true and B 2 with extra precondition one(list)=false. This way we obtain 24 constructors for step.
Reachability Reachability is encoded as an inductive type, having two constructors. The rst constructor encodes the reachability of the initial state. The second constructor encodes the preservation of reach under step. (4) The invariants For proving (3) we have to use the invariants. These invari- 4.3 Correctness Proof Goals Proofs of the invariants and the re nement are essentially by induction over the transitions and split in the corresponding 25 cases (one initial state and 24 transition steps have to be considered). As is to be expected, transitions that do not a ect variables that occur in an invariant prove in Coq simply by assumption with the induction hypothesis. Other cases resolve into further subgoals.
In this application of I/O automata, most predicates are equality assertions over state variables and the proofs involve much propositional reasoning. This is best illustrated by means of an example subgoal: Figure 2 shows a Coq goal that occurs when proving invariant INVR (Lemma 3). After elimination of reachable states (Section 4.2), Coq has lled in the variables and terms in proper places in the states before and after the transition, in the precondition, and in the invariant. The assertion to prove is on top, below that are the assumptions. This case corresponds to action G in case (ctoggle ! t=toggle). The latter condition is expressed by assumption H. Other preconditions of this transition arise as equalities over state variables that have been lled in automatically in the states before and after this transition. H 0 and H 1 assume reachability of these states. H 2 contains the induction hypothesis for the invariant property. The goal to prove is that the property holds for states after a G step.
The goal in Figure 2 decomposes in a number of subgoals. Figure 2 ) has been decomposed into its constituent conjuncts. Applications of projection functions in the goal and in the assumptions have been reduced to retrieve the appropriate terms.
Many of the goals and subgoals that occur while proving the invariants in this exercise consist of a logical combination of equality statements. The same observation holds for those assumptions in the context that have not yet been eliminated and can be of relevance to the un nished proof. In nearly all these cases the equality statements are over elements from nite sets. This holds for preconditions of transition steps as well as for predicates in the invariants.
The induction mechanism is often used in this exercise. Induction serves two purposes in the de nition of a set: it states that the given elements are the only inhabitants of the set (no junk property) and it states that all elements are di erent (no confusion property). Inductively de ned nite sets play an important role in the Coq checking of this veri cation, both to do analysis by cases as well as to distinguish between elements. Analysis by cases is provided directly in Coq via elimination of a variable over the elements of inductive set. Inequality of di erent elements of an inductively de ned nite set is not directly available in Coq but must be derived with the Match mechanism. Because the veri cation described here uses this type of reasoning extensively, it will be Fig. 2 . Characteristic Coq subgoal for this application. The assertion to prove is on top, the assumptions are below. The goal forms part of the obligation to prove that transition G preserves invariant INVR (Lemma 3). H2 assumes the invariant property holds for states that enable this transition step. The assertion to prove is that the property holds for states after the transition. For invariants that are proved by induction over transition steps, sometimes a majority of the subgoals prove by contradiction because they assume a=b for di erent a and b from an inductive set.
Tacticals Both tactics and tacticals have been used in the proof-checking. Coq tacticals are composed of tactics and they can be used to apply at once a combination of rules. They can also be used to accomplish a limited form of proof search. Such tacticals have been written for ve of the invariants in this application. One generic tactical was developed to decompose and investigate several lemmas. After case distinction over 25 cases (initial state and 24 transition steps), the tactical attempts to decompose these cases by elimination of logical connectives until only simple goals are left, where the assertion to prove is an equality assertion. For our invariants, typically some 50-100 simple goals are left then. Many of these are solved automatically by assumption, re exivity or by means of an inconsistent equality statement in the context. For the invariants above, only a handful of non-trivial goals then remain to be solved by the user.
To achieve a form of search, the tacticals are mainly composed of combinations of the ";" and "Orelse" tacticals explained below. tactical 1 ; tactical 2 ; tactical 3 This applies tactical 2 to the subgoals generated by tactical 1 and tactical 3 to those that are generated by tactical 2 .
tactical 1 Orelse tactical 2 Orelse tactical 3 This tries to apply tactical 1 . If that fails, tactical 2 is applied. If that fails, tactical 3 is applied. Coq tactical building blocks are fairly elementary. A de nition mechanism or parameterization is not provided. This could be convenient for this application, since it would allow often recurring tacticals like (5) to be written very compactly.
The current Coq tactical language has no variables and pattern matching. As a consequence, tacticals must be tailored to the overall structure of goals if they are used for proof search. Because of this, writing a tactical proof often is as much e ort as writing the corresponding tactic proof. Currently, the advantage of such tacticals is mainly that it is easier to adapt them than to adapt tactic proofs: tactical proofs are less a ected when invariants or automata are modi ed.
Discussion
The main objectives of this work have been ful lled: the protocol has been veri ed and the veri cation (at least the safety part of it) has been proof-checked. Although the Bounded Retransmission Protocol is small, it is by no means trivial and the e orts involved are considerable. While the PSF speci cation and simulation activity have been carried out in only two man-weeks, the manual veri cation took roughly two man-months (including write-up) and the proofchecking took more than three man-months. Part of the latter e ort is due to a learning e ect. Analysis of the Bounded Retransmission Protocol is not completed: the original protocol has an additional disconnect service that allows the sender and the receiver to disrupt an ongoing communication. This service has been neglected here and will be veri ed later. Apart from this, the protocol as described and veri ed in this paper contains most of the characteristics of the real protocol. It should be noted however that the model simpli es the real-time aspects of the protocol by the way timers are encoded. We could have modeled these real-time aspects more realistically by using a real-time extension of the I/O automata model (see 5]), but then the veri cation would have been much more involved.
Importance of the veri cation The veri cation has answered a number of questions about the protocol. Foremost, it proves that the data link protocol is free of design errors. An important result of the work is that it has corrected several inconsistencies, ambiguities, and omissions in the semi-formal original speci cation of the protocol. For instance, the exercise has pinned down the behavior of the toggle bit between subsequent messages and has formalized many assumptions that were previously left implicit. In addition, the correctness criterion given in the I/O automaton model formalizes the protocol service requirements, i.e., the required external behavior of the protocol.
The automaton speci cation also serves as a precise functional description for protocol implementations. In this description, all kind of important questions for implementors have been answered, like : \Can I send an empty message?", \How to respond if a request comes before the previous request is completed?", \What is the start value of the toggle bit for subsequent messages?". These issues are important if protocol implementations have to be developed by di erent programmers at di erent locations, as is the case with this protocol.
Other protocol properties are con rmed by the automaton model. For instance, invariant INVK 0 (Lemma 5) proves that the use of the bit named rst in data frames is redundant, because the receiver can always predict its value. This is consistent with the situation in the X.25 LAPB protocol 6] that has no comparable eld and that uses a more data bit only, which corresponds to the (inverted) bit named last in the Bounded Retransmission Protocol. Further, the automaton model con rms that the rst, last and toggle bits from the header of acknowledgements are irrelevant for correctness.
Proof-checking with Coq The experiences with the Coq system are positive.
The Coq system 5.8 is robust and reliable and is well-documented. Most shortcomings are related to the ASCII interface: it is easy to lose the overall picture when dealing with large contexts and large proofs.
The Coq proof-checking con rms that the veri cation is correct. It was not rst-time right though and the proof-checking has corrected a number of draft versions. Both the veri cation and the speci cation have been revised several times. Other corrections relate to various errors and inaccuracies in versions of the manuscript proof. Preliminary versions of six invariants required modication. One invariant proved false and required weakening. In four cases the original invariants were probably valid but the proof-checking revealed that they needed strengthening (induction loading) to admit a proof. In several cases small modi cations to the automaton were necessary to admit a missing proof. Much of the checking was done while parts of the proof were still under development and certain errors must therefore be ascribed to the iterative approach that characterizes the development of automata proofs. Usually the manuscript proof was followed, unless obvious simpli cations were seen. For one invariant the use of tacticals simpli ed a handwritten proof by abstaining from the application of two other invariants that were used in the manuscript proof.
If this application is characteristic of I/O automata proofs | and this seems to be the case | then I/O automata veri cations could bene t from proof search procedures. Many (sub-)proofs are truly elementary. It must be stressed that this quality does not come for free. In I/O automata veri cations the crucial and most di cult part is nding the proper automata, the weak re nement relation and the invariants. This is an iterative process that can bene t from proof search support. Proof search can be used in two ways: it can speed up the checking of manuscript proofs but it can also speed up their development. The Coq system is currently designed as a proof-checker and not as a theorem prover. Accordingly, the system was used in this exercise to check versions of the manuscript proof and the system was not explicitly exploited in the development of the proof. The tacticals written for this application indicate that it is feasible to reduce conjectures of invariants to a few non-trivial or impossible subgoals for the user. Most proof obligations in this application require very speci c and elementary reasoning. It seems that additional tactical building blocks can be of great help for future I/O automata veri cations. Such tacticals can facilitate the proof-checking but they may also be used in the development of the proofs.
Modeling I/O automata in type theory Modeling the Bounded Retransmission Protocol automata, the invariants and the weak re nement proof in type theory (Coq's Inductive Calculus of Constructions) posed no problem. The translation into type theory that has been used skips much of the generic notions of I/O automata introduced in Section 3.1, like action signatures and explicit sets of states and transitions, but instead directly encodes these notions for this particular application. An important question is if this encoding is satisfactory or how it can be improved upon. An advantage of the current mapping to type theory is that it closely follows the application and directly supports the checking of the invariants and the re nement proof. While this encoding thus facilitates the operational checking, it also amalgamates the automata theory and the application which makes it di cult to reuse much of the Coq text for other applications.
An interesting option is to use a more general encoding of automata theory, together with a compact application description similar to the speci cation in Section 3.2. This can lead to an approach that is more exible because it allows reuse of the theory part for di erent applications. Also, the simpler applica-tion description is less error-prone. The current encoding is tailored towards the proving of invariants and weak re nement relations. Absence of deadlock has to be de ned speci cally for this application and cannot be reconstructed easily from the transition steps. In an approach that explicitly models the meta theory of I/O automata, such properties can be de ned independent of the particular application. A disadvantage of that approach is the extra theory level that enforces more elaborate and indirect proofs. Automatic translation of a combined meta theory encoding together with a particular application description into one application-speci c encoding seems desirable, in order to obtain the advantages of the latter. The translation can be within Coq or part of a preprocessor. One may even want to use di erent translations for di erent purposes. Some of these options are currently investigated by the authors.
Related work Recently, there has been a growing interest in proof-checking protocol correctness proofs, see for instance 4, 8] . Since it is impossible to give here a complete overview of all the work in this area, we will only mention some papers that are directly related to our work, either by the choice of the concurrency formalism or by the choice of the proof-checking system.
Nipkow 23] veri ed two implementations of a memory system and a mutual exclusion algorithm using the theorem prover Isabelle 25] . The veri cations were done both in a setting of algebraic data types (using data re nement) and in the I/O automaton model (using simulation relations). Loewenstein and Dill 17] veri ed a multiprocessor cache protocol using simulation relations and HOL, the Higher-Order Logic of 11]. This case study is similar in spirit to the one of Nipkow but more involved. Engberg, Gr nning and Lamport 10] report on a tool that translates proofs in Lamport's Temporal Logic of Actions to input for LP, the Larch Prover of 13]. A few simple examples were veri ed using the tool, including a spanning tree algorithm. In these examples the mechanically checkable proofs written in the translator were only two to three times longer than careful hand proofs. S gaard-Andersen et.al. 26 ] formalized a simple I/O automata veri cation of a communication protocol using the LP veri cation system. They report that, after all the basic machinery of the I/O automata model has been formalized, as well as the basic data types employed by the protocol, the use of LP even leads to a reduction in the size of the proofs. However, their example is quite simple (there is no need to establish state invariants) and it remains to generalize these results to larger examples. Bezem and Groote 3] have used Coq to check a veri cation of the alternating bit protocol in process algebra. Their proofs are essentially based on rewriting. Recently, Groote and Van de Pol 12] have also veri ed the Bounded Retransmission Protocol in process algebra using Coq. Whether one prefers process algebra or the I/O automata model appears to be a matter of taste, and in order to evaluate the relative merits of both approaches we will have to consider more and bigger examples. Martin Hofmann 14] in Edinburgh has checked a veri cation of the Alternating Bit Protocol with LEGO 18] . His veri cation is based on a functional approach and uses stream transformers.
All of the above researchers arrive at approximately the same conclusion: mechanically checking of protocol veri cations is feasible and highly promising, but the current proof-checkers are not optimal: we need an improved user interface (along the lines of 10]) and better proof search procedures.
